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Real analysis, founded on the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms, buttressed by the
axiom of choice, is the dominant variety of mathematics utilized in the formal-
ization of economic theory. The accident of history that led to this dominance
is not inevitable, especially in an age when the digital computer seems to be
ubiquitous in research, teaching and learning. At least three other varieties of
mathematics, each underpinned by its own mathematical logic, have come to be
used in the formalization of mathematics in more recent years. To set theory,
model theory, proof theory and recursion theory correspond, roughly speak-
ing, real analysis, non-standard analysis, constructive analysis and computable
analysis. These other varieties, we claim, are more consistent with the intrinsic
nature and ontology of economic concepts. In this paper we discuss aspects
of the way real analysis dominates the mathematical formalization of economic
theory and the prospects for overcoming this dominance.
21 Preamble
"Indeed virtually any ￿ interesting￿question about dynamical systems is ￿ in
general ￿undecidable."
Ian Stewart, ([45], p.664)
Many years ago, Richard Goodwin, pointed out that the dynamics of an
economic system could be interpreted as the path traced by a computing device,
([19], p.1):
"[I]t is entirely permissible to regard the motion of an economy as a
process of computing answers to the problems posed to it."
The idea he was trying to convey was that a path traced by a dynamical
system, as we refer to them in the post-Smale era ([43]), could be viewed as
being analogous1 to the sequential outcome of a suitably programmed analogue
or digital computing device. Forty years later, reporting the pioneering undecid-
ability results for dynamical systems derived by Newton Da Costa and Francisco
Doria, ([11], [12]), in Nature, Ian Stewart ￿ closed the circle￿ , so to speak:
"It is clearly permissible to represent the behaviour of an electronic
computer ￿or more simply a genuinely mechanical model of a Turing
machine - as a dynamical system."
[45], p.664
A few years later one of the celebrated decision problems in dynamical sys-
tems theory - Arnold￿ s Hilbert Symposium Problem2 - was decisively and fa-
mously solved by Da Costa and Doria, [13].
1Ulam, in his stimulating essay in honour of Marc Kac, extolled the virtues of invoking
analogies, [46], p.35;
"Banach often remarked ￿ Good mathematicians see analogies between theorems
and proofs; the very best see analogies between analogies.￿ ..... Throughout the
development of mathematics and with the growth of new concepts and more-
complicated notions, a cohesive tendency and organic structure have been guided
by a feeling of analogy between the old and new ideas."
2As reported in [13], (p.152, italics added), the problem posed in ([2]) was:
Is the stability problem for stationary points algorithmically decidable? The
well-known Lyapunov theorem solves the problem in the absence of eigenvalues
with zero real parts. In more complicated cases, where the stability depends on
higher order terms in the Taylor series, there exist no algebraic criterion.
Let a vector ￿eld be given by polynomials of a ￿xed degree, with rational
coe¢ cients. Does an algorithm exist, allowing to decide, whether the stationary
point is stable?
A similar problem: Does there exist an algorithm to decide, whether a plane
polynomial vector ￿eld has a limit cycle?"
Of course, the discerning reader and a connoisseur of dynamical systems theory will recog-
nise, immediately, the connection of this ￿ Arnold Problem￿with that most obdurate of Hilbert￿ s
Problems, part B of the 16th. But even the connoisseur may not be aware that a purely eco-
nomic hypothesis, modelled as an innovative dynamical system, was the motivation for a
partial solution to part B of Hilbert￿ s 16th Problem ([15]).
3We had been dividing our waking, intellectual, lives between the apparently
unconnected ￿elds of computable economics and endogenous economic dynam-
ics, without ever seriously trying to forge a link or seek a coherency between
them. However, by the late 80￿ s, with a burgeoning economic theoretic lit-
erature, harnessing results and frameworks from the post-Smale literature on
dynamical systems theory, dominating one strand of endogenous economic dy-
namics, our perplexities grew and the schizophrenia was beginning to become
intolerable. The perplexity was, of course, the problem of SDIC: sensitive de-
pendence on initial conditions of interesting nonlinear dynamical systems3: how
much of the dynamics was due to the arti￿ce of simulation and investigation
using digital computing devices and how much due to the intrinsic nonlinear-
ities of the dynamics. It is against this background, at a particular stage in
our schizophrenic intellectual life, that we came across the above classics by Da
Costa and Doria and, therefore, the minds were receptive to the challenges they
broached and posed.
Soon after some reasonable acquaintance with the above papers by Da Costa
and Doria, one of us was able, for the ￿rst time, to interpret the textbook
mapping of the price simplex into itself dynamically and use their insights to
prove undecidabilities and uncomputabilities intrinsic to it. All that is meant
by dynamic interpretation was to change the textbook notation (cf. [3], chapter
1, [44], chapter 1), to:
pt+1 =
pt + M (pt)
(pt + M (pt))e
(1)
Where:
M (pt) : a mapping from the standard price simplex into itself (depending
on the usual excess demand vector, say z(p));
p : a vector of prices;
e : an appropriately dimensioned normalizing column vector;
Interpreting, ￿rstly, the mapping as a dynamical system, the next step was
to construct a Turing Machine, formally equivalent to it. Next, assuming, for
example that the price sequence was at least recursively enumerable, it was
possible to use either Rice￿ s theorem or the theorem of the Unsolvability of
the Halting Problem for Turing Machines, to demonstrate various ￿ negative￿￿
i.e., undecidability and uncomputability ￿results. All this entailed a series of
mathematical results and a wholly di⁄erent mathematical framework in which
to encapsulate a standard problem. However, this alternative framework, that
of classical recursion theory, was genuinely and intrinsically computational. The
domain over which prices and goods were de￿ned was natural to the economics
of the problem. Why, then was the paraphernalia of standard real analysis so
ubiquitous in mathematical economics?
3Or, as Hirsch emphasised in his outstanding survey, ([24]. p.23, italics in the original):
"[O]nly nonlinear di⁄erential equations have interesting dynamics."
4In economic dynamics, stability and uniqueness of equilibrium solutions have
become almost a dogma, ([39]). Economists have, with customary princely un-
concern, ignored these fundamental algorithmic undecidabilities. That neither
stability, nor uniqueness ￿and not even equilibria ￿can be decided algorith-
mically for ￿ interesting￿dynamical systems may well be an implicit reason for
economists to concentrate on decidable, uninteresting, predominantly linear sys-
tems, particularly in economic dynamics.
Or, perhaps, the reason is much simpler, and consistent with the main theme
in this paper: pure ignorance of the varieties of mathematics that can be used
to formalize and experimentally investigate economic problems. Algorithmic
undecidability of properties of dynamical systems requires considerable mastery
of recursion theory, metamathematical methods, dynamical systems theory and
even, in some cases, nonstandard analysis and nonstandard logics. Economists,
festooned to a mathematical economics underpinned by real analysis, have been
forced to assert controversial propositions regarding stability, uniqueness and
equilibria entirely on the basis of an emaciated mathematical formalism.
The aim in this paper is to try to alert the interested and mathematically
minded young economists to avail themselves of the opportunity to ask questions
￿ unaskable￿in the orthodox framework of mathematical economics. The subject
is vast; our attempts cannot be more than a sketch. If the sketch succeeds
in whetting the appetite of a few, perhaps the authors will attempt a more
comprehensive essay at some future date; even better, someone else may feel
inspired to carry a baton for a next lap.
In the formal introductory section, §2, we shall outline the aims and scope
telegraphically. In §3, there will be some examples of the way alternative vari-
eties of mathematics may enrich the possibilities of formalization to raise ques-
tions that cannot be posed in the framework of standard mathematical eco-
nomics. The ultra-brief concluding section, §4, is perhaps to be read as an
outline of a manifesto4 on Re-Mathematizing Economic Theory
2 Introduction
"The conventional approach [to mathematics] involves an idealiza-
tion, because one cannot actually complete an in￿nite number of
observations. The [nonstandard] approach also involves an idealiza-
tion, because one cannot actually complete a nonstandard number
of observations. In fact, it is in the nature of mathematics to deal
with idealizations. The choice of formalism must be based on es-
thetic considerations, such as directness of expression, simplicity,
and power. Actually, di⁄erent formalisms in no way exclude each
other, and it can be illuminating to look at familiar material from a
fresh point of view."
Edward Nelson, [31], p.13.
4A ￿ manifesto￿in the sense in which the word is used in the in￿uential work by Blum,
et.al., [7].
5The problem of alternative mathematical formalisms in economics enters at
the ground ￿ oor, in an almost trivial way. Anyone who uses the real number
continuum to model economic dynamics, particularly in policy contexts, faces
the problem of ￿ causality￿in the following simplistic sense. The real number con-
tinuum, when used with standard real analysis as its foundation, cannot furnish
an immediate predecessor or an immediate successor to any given point in time5.
However, the continuum of nonstandard analysis, encompassing the in￿nitesimal
rigorously, can be viewed as a system composed of discernible in￿nitesimally dis-
crete sequences. Naturally, the constructing economist6, basing economic theory
on, say Bishop￿ s version of constructive analysis, ([5]), almost naturally accom-
modates causality in a numerically meaningful and computationally signi￿cant
sense. Economists, whether as general equilibrium theorists of a microeconomic
or macroeconomic7 hue or as many other varieties of mathematical economists,
are rather cavalier about invoking the real number continuum as their domain
of de￿nition and real analysis as the mathematics to encapsulate it.
At a much more basic level, the beginning graduate student of economics is
introduced to real analysis, say via [32], and confronts, in the preliminary pages
the following theorems, (ibid, p. 41 and p. 52):
Theorem 1 Every nonempty subset S of < that is bounded from above has a
supremum ( a least upper bound).
Theorem 2 Every bounded real sequence has a convergent subsequence.
The former is stated as ￿ The Completeness Axiom￿ , and the latter as the
￿ Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem￿ , in [32]. The former is also stated as the Least
Upper Bound Property. The point we wish to make is that neither of these theo-
rems are numerically meaningful; nor are they computationally viable. The for-
mer is invalid in computable analysis; the latter in constructive analysis. Why,
then, should economists be asked to build their formal mathematical founda-
tions on these sands?
Or, take an example from smooth in￿nitesimal analysis[4], an imaginative
eclectic synthesis of nonstandard and constructive analysis. Suppose we call two
points a and b on < distinguishable or distinct when they are not identical, i.e.,
￿ (a = b), written, as usual, as a 6= b; and, indistinguishable in the contrary
case, i.e., if ￿ (a 6= b), then it does not imply a ￿ b: In other words, in the world
of smooth in￿nitesimal analysis, it is not the case that all in￿nitesimals coincide
with 0 and the tertium non datur does not necessarily hold. It shares the former
property with nonstandard analysis; the latter with constructive analysis.
5The perceptive mathematical economist might say that things are no better with the
domain of rational numbers. So much the worse for the rational numbers would be our
response!
6See below, §4, where the di⁄erence between constructive and computable analysis is made
in a way that gives content to this phrase.
7Roughly speaking, such theorists emphasize stability, uniqueness and equilibria; other
mathematical economists are prepared to endow their mathematical formalisms with more
tolerance for instability, non-uniqueness and disequilibria. There are, of course, notable ex-
ceptions on both sides
6As another example of an interesting eclectic synthesis, entirely motivated
by the need to encapsulate, ab initio, numerical meaning and computational
content, is the so-called Russian Constructivism. [8]. Here the synthesis is
between a variant of constructive mathematics and recursion theory. The logic
that underpins Russian Constructivism is a variant of intuitionistic logic; but
this school also accepts and works within a version of the Church-Turing Thesis.
In each of the last two examples, a philosophy of numerical meaning and
computational content is a driving force for the development of the mathematical
framework - the superstructure, so to speak. In the case of the ￿rst example,
taken from a putative textbook on Real Analysis with Economic Applications,
no such consideration ever arises in its copiously technical almost 800 pages.
It is this perplexity that we are trying to address and resolve, however par-
tially, in this paper. What criteria are we to use or invoke for the kind of
mathematics that economists should use?
Now, Nelson￿ s entirely understandable view of the criterion for ￿ the choice
of formalism￿must deal with the problem of de￿ning, in an acceptable and
fairly uniform way, the notion of ￿ aesthetic considerations￿ . On the other
hand, an outstanding pure mathematician like Hardy, [22] and an eminent and
supremely successful mathematical physicist like Dirac, [16], would - indeed,
have - both, from their own respective subject￿ s point of view, endorsed Nelson￿ s
vision. Pragmatically, however, the Putnam-Quine indispensability argument,
[36], [37], for choosing a formalism based on standard real analysis is, perhaps,
the orthodox vision8. The ￿ indispensabilists￿￿ ounder on the deep ontological
issues and doubts raised about their program by Feferman ([17], p.284)9:
"If one accepts the indispensability arguments, there still remain
two critical questions:
8I dismiss ad hoc justi￿cations given by unre￿ective economists ￿or would-be economists
￿as not worth serious consideration from the point of view of the foundations of mathematics
or even from the vantage point of numerically meaningful and computationally signi￿cant
mathematical formalisms. For example it is stated in ([30], p.1; italics added):
"Computing with real numbers .... is also relevant to applications in economic
theory. Economic models typically use real variables and functions of them."
But it is not explained or even seriously discussed why ￿ economic models typically use real
variable ... .￿The appeal to [6] is an attempt at ex post justi￿cation for a modelling philosophy
that had nothing to do with ￿ scienti￿c computation￿at its inception. No one with the most
basic knowledge of the exercise of mathematization of economic theory would claim anything
other than pure accident, convenience and ignorance for the formalization of the subject in
terms of standard real analysis.
9Feferman￿ s thoughtful closing remark and query is also relevant in the context of the
mathematical economists￿penchant for modelling in terms of real numbers and standard real
analysis, ibid, p. 298:
"[A]s long as science takes the real number system for granted, its philosophers
must eventually engage the basic foundational question of modern mathematics:
￿ What are the real numbers, really?￿ "
The economic apologist￿ s retort may well be that ￿ its philosophers￿are irrelevant ￿or don￿ t
exist ￿for the mathematical modelling enterprise of the economic theorist. This instrumen-
talist position is, in fact, the dominant one in mathematical economics.
7Q1. Just which mathematical entities are indispensable to cur-
rent scienti￿c theories?
Q2. Just what principles concerning those entities are needed for
the required mathematics?"
We believe these are the two crucial questions, even if not framed in the
context of a critique of an ￿ indispensability argument￿ , that a mathematical
economist, who relies exclusively on any one type of mathematical formalism
for economic modelling, should try to answer - or, at least, keep as disciplin-
ing background criteria. Our vision in this paper is almost entirely disciplined
by these two perceptive questions that Feferman raises against the ￿ indispens-
abilists￿ . In other words, we take it that the serious mathematical economist is
at least a closet ￿ indispensabilist￿and, therefore, the themes in this essay are
grounded on: (a). casting doubt on the kind of ￿ mathematical entities that
are considered indispensable￿in orthodox mathematical economics; and, (b).
questioning the kind of ￿ principles concerning these entities￿that are claimed as
￿ necessary for the required mathematics￿ . Our examples are, therefore, meant
to illustrate that the chosen ￿ mathematical entities￿and the ￿ principles concern-
ing these entities￿are not appropriate, necessary, relevant or indispensable for
mathematical economic modelling.
The infelicities and pitfalls of mathematical economics in the real analytic
mode ￿or in terms of standard mathematics - are discussed more extensively
in two companion pieces to this paper, [48], [52].
3 Examples
"The purpose .... was to present a number of examples in which
a plausible expectation is not borne out by a more careful analysis.
In some cases the outcome of a calculation is contrary to what our
physical intuition appears to demand. In other cases an approxima-
tion which looks convincing turns out to be unjusti￿ed, or one that
looks unreasonable turns out to be adequate.
....
The selection of examples is very subjective. Most concern sur-
prises experienced by myself, ...., others I found fascinating when I
heard of them."
Rudolf Peierls, [34], p.vii
We shall consider three examples in this section: the celebrated and funda-
mental Peano existence theorem for ordinary di⁄erential equations (ODE), the
so-called initial value problem (IVP) for ODEs; the existence of ducks, discov-
ered by a nonstandard analysis of the famous van der Pol equation; and the
role of the axiom of determinateness in games and the possibility of dispensing
with the axiom of choice. The ￿rst is part of the ￿ folklore￿of mathematics ed-
ucation for graduate students of economics (cf. [32], 636); the second, i.e., the
van der Pol equation, is ￿or, at least, has been ￿a staple for connoisseurs of
8macroeconomic endogenous business cycle theories. The third issue, the role of
the axiom of choice in economic discourse, is a mysterious one. Mathematical
economists seem not to be aware of, or not care if they are aware, of the pos-
sible implications of the use of this theorem in economic analysis. It played a
signi￿cant role in Peano￿ s own choice of methods of proof for the theorem of
existence for the IVP problem of ODEs.
3.1 The Peano Existence Theorem
"Our next application [of the Schauder ￿xed point theorem] concerns
a famed existence theorem that was ￿rst proved in 1890 by Giuseppe
Peano (by a di⁄erent and much clumsier technique)."
[32], pp. 635-6; italics added.
The above quote is from the massive textbook on Real Analysis with Eco-
nomic Applications that will, surely, become standard staple for graduate stu-
dents of economics. We are not told by the author10 what it was that was
￿ clumsier￿in Peano￿ s proof; nor are we told that Peano went out of his way to
avoid any appeal to the axiom of choice in his proof. Furthermore, we are also
deprived of the information that Peano dropped the assumption of the Lipschitz
condition in the 1890 paper (thereby losing uniqueness, [25], p.66). Indeed, it
was during the course of this proof that the ubiquity of this controversial axiom
was ￿rst recognised and avoided - long before Zermelo christened it the axiom
of choice, fourteen years later, in fact. It may be salutory to compare the above
unscholarly dismissal of Peano￿ s proof with the studied and careful caveats given
by Flett in his detailed study of the IVP problem for ODEs, ([18], p. 158; italics
added):
"Peano￿ s second paper .. on the existence problem of continuous f
deals with the general case of the vector equation y0 = f (t;y) ...
. Peano￿ s proof is both long and arduous, since what is essentially
a proof of the Ascoli-Arzela theorem is intricately embedded in it.
His argument is also rendered more arduous than might be expected
by being couched in the symbolic language of the logical calculus,
though he does include a six-page ￿ rØsumØ￿ of the proof written in
everyday mathematical language."
We￿ preface￿this section with the above observations just to make note of
the fact that, once again, ignorance of alternative mathematical traditions and
10Incidentally, Peano￿ s 1890 paper was in French, published in a German Journal. His
earlier paper, for the scalar case, was in Italian. There is a translation to English of the latter,
but not of the former. Are we to believe that the author of [32] read this French version
carefully to understand the nature of the ￿ clumsiness￿in Peano￿ s proof? One of us gave it
a try, in the original, and found it almost impenetrable, without considerable background
hilfenkonstruktion. Of course, our di¢ culties are no criteria for the ability of others. But, in
French ...! We also suggest that this author read both Rubel, [38], pp. 48-9, Problem 14 &
Remark 14; and also [54] & [28], regarding Peano existence theorems.
9careless understanding of the underpinning axioms, lead to misleading assertions
that are, then, propagated generation after generation.
Here is a ￿ modern￿statement of the Peano theorem11,([26], pp.364-5):
Theorem 3 Peano existence theorem:
Let the function f : [t0;t0 + a] ￿ U ! <d; where U ￿ <d, be continuous in
the cylinder:
S = f(t;x)g : t 2
h
t0;t0 + ￿];x 2 <
d;kx ￿ y0k ￿ b
i
where a;b > 0 and the vector norm k:k is given. Then, the ODE:








and ￿ = sup
(t;x)2S
kf (t;x)k
possesses at least one solution
However, in the mathematics of Russian Constructivism, it can be shown
that 9f(t;y), satisfying the hypotheses of the Peano existence theorem, such
that there is no solution to the IVP ([1], chapters 3 and 11). Why is this
so? Essentially this is because the existence of a solution violates a cardinal
theorem of computable calculus: the Unsovability of the Halting Problem for
Turing Machines. More speci￿cally, there are a series of nonsolvable problems
by ￿nite means, in the computable calculus of Russian Constructivism, some of
which have to be made solvable ￿by non-￿nite means ￿for the Peano existence
theorem to be satis￿ed. In the case of the Peano existence theorem, the relevant
non-solvable problems are:
Proposition 4 It is undecidable (by ￿nite means) whether, 8a 2 <;a or ￿ a
is rational.
Proposition 5 It is undecidable (by ￿nite means) whether, 8a 2 R;a ￿ 0 or
a ￿ 0:
Thus, implicit in any standard proof of the Peano existence theorem there
are appeals to non-￿nite means to decide disjunctions. These are almost never
made explicit, except by supremely careful mathematicians like Peano who go
into great detail and pains to make sure that one is at least aware of the role
of unacceptable non-￿nitary axioms, for example, the axiom of choice. If the
mathematics we invoke, in formalizing economics, appeals to non-￿nite means of
verifying disjunctions, then it is useless for any kind of application, particularly
in policy contexts.
11We have chosen to state the ￿ modern￿version from this admirable textbook by Iserless,
([26]), mainly because it is devoted to the ￿ numerical analysis of di⁄erential equations￿ .
10This does not mean that theorems analogous to the Peano existence theorem
cannot be devised in computable, constructive or nonstandard analysis, (cf.,
[10], [23], [54] and [38] and the references in the latter to Aberth and Pour-El
& Richards, as well as [35]). It is just that one will have to be more selective in
the hypotheses and less grandiose in the conclusions. Surely, these are virtues,
to be made available to students at the earliest possible stage of their advanced
education?
3.2 Non-standard Ducks in the van der Pol Equation
3.2.1 A Prologue
"In the late 17th century, when Newton and Leibniz were ￿rst
inventing calculus, part of their theory involved in￿nitesimals ￿i.e.,
numbers that are in￿nitely small but nonzero. .... Indeed, the con-
ventional real number system is Dedekind complete and therefore
Archimedean, which essentially means that it lacks in￿nitesimals;
..... .
The advantage of nonstandard mathematics is that its intuition
is sometimes helpful; .... Leibniz and Newton had in￿nitesimals in
mind when they invented the calculus; surely this is testimony to
the usefulness of the intuition of nonstandard mathematics.
[40], pp.394-6; italics added.
Economists routinely reason in terms of in￿nitesimals, without, of course, re-
alizing it. Every time mathematical economists cavalierly invokes ￿ price taking￿
behaviour due to the insigni￿cance of individual agents in a perfectly competi-
tive market, they are also invoking poor old Archimedes, too.
3.2.2 van der Pol Ducks
"In the course of making enquiries for the Colloquium on Dynam-
ical Systems I found out that van der Pol was often more mathemat-
ical than physical in his approach to problems. He would construct
a physical system to correspond to a mathematical equation, and
pushed the study of the equation known by his name into regions
where it ceased to correspond to the physical system as closely as
some other mathematical formulation. In particular, in 1920, he
chose a slightly unusual circuit in order to obtain his famous equa-
tion:




_ x + x = 0
￿ small, and he was the ￿rst (apart from Rayleigh) to obtain an
equation representing a system with a single strongly stable oscilla-
tion."
Mary Cartwright, [9], p. 330.
11The van der Pol equation, and its integrated form as the Rayleigh equation,
played an important role in the nonlinear (endogenous) theory of the business
cycle in the ￿ Golden Age￿of Keynesian dominance12. Even now, the declining
number of endogenous, disequilibrium, macrodynamists seek their foundations
in the classic work of those pioneers who modelled the business cycle in terms
of variations of the van der Pol equation. A full understanding of the equation
remains elusive, particularly in its forced form, in which form it has played
an important part in the development of dynamical systems theory. The full
economic background to its use in business cycle theory, and the mathematical
underpinnings, are extensively discussed in a series of three papers by one of us
and we refer the interested reader to them for further information, ([49], [50]
and [51]).
Our interest here is to point out the way, using nonstandard analysis, unusual
phase portraits were discovered for this fascinating equation13. Zvonkin and
Shubin, in their detailed and rigorous analysis of the issue here, summarised
admirably the nature of the discovery, [55], p.69, italics added:
"Ducks are certain singular solutions of equations with a small
parameter, which are studied in the theory of relaxation oscillations.
These solutions were ￿rst found for the van der Pol equation, and
their form resembled that of a ￿ ying duck. Duck theory is, in the
authors￿opinion, the most striking application of the techniques of
non-standard analysis.
......
It was not by chance that ducks were discovered with the help of
non-standard analysis and in connection with it. We think that the
language of non-standard analysis will make it easy for a wide circle
of mathematicians to become acquainted with the theory of ducks
and the theory of relaxation oscillations in general."
Relaxation oscillations encompass two-phase dynamics in the sense that
there is an interaction between slow and fast variables in the system, rather
like one set of markets (￿nancial?) clearing ￿ in￿nitely fast￿ , and another set
(real?) clearing relatively slow. The problem, of course, is that ￿ in￿nitely fast￿
is a meaningless concept in standard analysis, but an eminently sensible notion
in nonstandard analysis; analogously, the ￿ in￿nitesimal￿is a fully viable concept
in nonstandard analysis, but not so in standard analysis.
12Its ￿rst appearances in the business cycle literature were in unfortunately neglected papers
by Hamburger ([20], [21], as equation # 7, on p.5, in the former and in footnote 7, p.6 in the




1 ￿ y2￿ dy
dt
+ !2y = 0
13We hasten to add that, ex post, standard analysis has been able to re-absorb the new
discoveries into its fold. The point remains, however, that the original discovery came about
by a fertile use of nonstandard analysis.





x + x2￿ dx
dt
+ x + ￿ = 0 (2)
This can be represented as:
dx
dt
= ￿￿1(y ￿ f(x)) (3)
dy
dt
= ￿(x + ￿) (4)








The phase-plane dynamics depicted in the diagrams below are for the fol-
lowing numerical values of ￿ and ￿ (the red curves, in all cases, are the graphs
of the ￿ cubic characteristic￿ ).
1. The values to get the ￿rst ￿gure were so chosen that the phase-plane dy-
namics would resemble, as closely as possible, that given in the pioneering
nonlinear trade cycle model of Goodwin; here, ￿ = :45;￿ = 10;
2. The second ￿gure, almost similar in its geometry to the ￿rst one, has:
￿ = :5;￿ = 1000;
3. Figures 3 and 4 (the ￿ Duck Headed vdP￿ dynamics) are obtained for:
￿ = :001012345;￿ = 1000;
4. Finally, the two curves for the ￿ Unheaded Duck vdP￿ s are obtained for:
￿ = :00001025;￿ = 1000;
For ￿ = 0 and if 1
2x2 is replaced by x; the system reduces to the van der Pol
equation on the LiØnard plane14.
It is clear that y is the ￿ slow￿variable; i.e., it is ￿nite for all ￿nite points of
the domain of the plane; x, then, is the ￿ fast￿variable and takes in￿nitely large
values for some ￿nite values of its domain. If the trajectory of y is de￿ned to
be on that curve at which _ x = 0, then its graph is given by f(x):
As for the ￿ Duck￿terminology, the idea should be obvious from a perusal of
the diagrams (and a bit of imagination!).
The proof of existence of ￿ Unheaded Ducks;, i.e., counter-intuitive cycles
being attracted to unstable manifolds, for the van der Pol system is extremely
simple - provided one learns a bit of nonstandard analysis - or, at least, non-
standard terminology. Let us simply state it, in as heuristic and intuitive way
14I chose the ￿ characteristic￿with the 1
2x2 term, instead of the x term only because I had
severe di¢ culties of precision to get the kind of phase-plane dynamics I could have got with
a computer capable of more precise computations.
13as possible, to illustrate what we mean; the interested reader can get a clear
idea from the exceptionally clear and detailed article by Zvonkin and Shubin.
The only thing to keep in mind is that ￿ in an in￿nitesimal in the sense of
nonstandard analysis. Then15 (referring to the last two phase-plane diagrams)
and [55], §4.2:
De￿nition 6 An admissible form for the characteristic, f(x).
f(x) has an admissible form on a closed interval, say [￿1;￿2]; if:
(1). f(x) 2 [￿1;￿2] is standard and C2;
(2). f(x) 2 [￿1;￿2] has exactly two isolated extremum points, say a mini-
mum at x0, and a maximum at x1; and ￿1 < x1 < x0 < ￿2; so that: f0(x) > 0
on [￿1;x1) and (x0;￿2] and f0(x) < 0 on (x1;x0);
(3). f(￿1) < f(x0) and f(￿2) > f(x1);
Theorem 7 Existence of Duck Cycles in the van der Pol system [(2) or (3)￿
(5)].
Suppose f(x) has an admissible form on [￿1;￿2]; if x￿ 2 < and x￿ 2 (x2;x0);
then 9 value of the in￿nitesimal ￿, for which the van der Pol system has a Duck-
Cycle such that x￿ is the value on the x-coordinate corresponding to the ￿ beak￿
of the ￿ Duck￿ .
The point of the exercise is that a knowledge of the possibilities for explor-
ing a dynamical system with parameters and variables taking in￿nitesimal and
in￿nite values is indispensable - not just for reasons of pure mathematical aes-
thetics; but also for eminent economic reasons, where ￿nancial market variables
move ￿ in￿nitely￿fast, at least relative to ￿ real￿variables; and reactions in market
sentiments to ￿ in￿nitesimal￿variations in parameters is a non-negligible factor
in turbulent markets. An economist, narrowly trained in standard mathemat-
ics will always have to resort to ad hockeries to handle the in￿nitesimal and
the in￿nity - for example, in models capable of relaxation oscillations. Quite
apart from aesthetics and pragmatics, it is also the case that the mathematics
of nonstandard analysis is intuitively natural and much simpler, without all the
arti￿cial paraphernalia of the ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
0 calisthenics:
15This is only a su¢ cient condition and the ￿ admissible curve￿is simply a formalization of
the traditional ￿ cubic characteristic￿for the van der Pol equation. We conjecture that ￿ Duck
Cycles￿can be shown to exist even without a ￿ cubic characteristic￿ ; say, for example, with a
￿ characteristic￿of the form: ￿
￿
e _ x ￿ 2
￿
: Such a form would have only one isolated maximum
or minimum.


























































































203.3 Axiom of Choice vs. Axiom of Determinacy
"[Steinhaus] was aware of the following theorem: Let G be a
two-person game with perfect information, terminating in a ￿nite
number of moves in a win by one of the players. Then there must
exist a winning strategy for wither one or the other adversary.
....
Steinhaus now proposed that this simple theorem be made into
an axiom [the Axiom of Determinacy] by removing the restriction
that n is ￿nite, i.e., that the game must terminate in a ￿nite number
of moves.
It is here that one runs afoul of the axiom of choice."
Mark Kac, [27], p.577, italics added.
How does the Axiom of Determinacy (AD) ￿ run afoul￿of the Axiom of
Choice (AC)? Consider the following heuristic description of the Banach-Mazur
game16.




















Player A wins the game if ￿ 2 S;
Player B wins the game if ￿ = 2 S;
Claim 9 Mycielski showed the following: AC implies that 9 a set S ￿ (0;1) s.t
neither A nor B had a winning strategy.
Hence: AD !￿ AC
Our interest in the controversy over a choice between AD and AC is entirely
motivated by our belief that the kind of games introduced by Banach, Mazur
and Steinhaus, subsequently codi￿ed for economics by Gale and Stewart, are
alternative games that are playable by Turing Machines. Hence, following the
great pioneering work by Michael Rabin, it is possible to frame, entirely in
Turing￿ s tradition, questions of ￿ playability￿ . In other words, not only is it inter-
esting to attempt to eschew any reliance on AC and its insidious consequences
(for example, the Banach-Tarski Paradox); but also to supplement the determi-
nateness of alternating games, guaranteed by working with AD, with questions
of e⁄ective playability. Thus, even though the primary question, in the context
of alternating games, is to guarantee determinateness, i.e., assurance that one
or the other player has a winning strategy, the almost equally important next
question should be: given determinacy can the determined winner be provided
with e⁄ective instructions to actually implement the winning strategy? Using
16I have described and discussed this kind of game in some detail in [47], Chapter 7.
21the methods devised in the negative solution to Hilbert￿ s 10th Problem, it can
be shown that, in general, that the answer is negative.
But there is a much simpler reason, as well. In orthodox mathematical
economics the notions of equilibrium, stability and uniqueness are crucial. No
respectable mathematical economist would dream of working within an axiom
system that precludes equilibria, for example. That is the issue here, in the case
of alternating games, a genre that, in its modern incarnation, descends from
Zermelo - a supreme irony! After all, AC was a product of Zermelo￿ s fertile
imagination! A community that would consider it nothing short of a scandal if
its mathematical framework precluded equilibria should be equally petri￿ed by
a reliance on an axiom - AC - that precludes determinacy in an interesting class
of games.
But how can a program of education or research in, and for, the mathemat-
ically minded economist, be implemented without starting at the ground ￿ oor
- i.e., graduate mathematical background?
About a quarter of a century ago, Harvey Friedman and those associated
with him initiated the ￿ reverse mathematics￿program. Stephen Simpson￿ s spe-
ci￿c contribution on, ￿ Which Set Existence Axioms are Needed to Prove the
Cauchy/Peano Theorem for Ordinary Di⁄erential Equations￿ , [42], was a sig-
ni￿cant part of that program. In the context of the topic discussed in the ￿rst
subsection above and also in unearthing the implicit use of thoughtless axiom
system to underpin the mathematics of economics, it may be useful to recall,
against the backdrop of the issues raised in this essay, the opening lines of
Simpson￿ s thoughtful paper (ibid, p.783; italics in the original):
"This paper is part of a program whose ultimate goal is to answer
the following Main Question: what set existence axioms are needed to
prove the theorems of ordinary mathematics? We believe that such
a program has important implications for the philosophy of math-
ematics, especially with respect to the foundations of mathematics
and the existence of mathematical objects."
This is, of course, related to the doubts raised by Feferman to the Putnam-
Quine thesis; it is, surely, worthy of some interest to the mathematical econo-
mist?
4 Re-Mathematizing Economic Theory
"[Nonstandard analysis] does not present us with a single number
system which extends the real numbers, but with many related sys-
tems. Indeed, there seems to be no natural way to give preference
to just one among them. This contrasts with the classical approach
to the real numbers, which are supposed to constitute a unique or,
more precisely, categorical totality. However, ...., I belong to those
who consider that it is in the realm of possibility that at some stage
22even the established number systems will, perhaps under the in￿ u-
ence of developments in set theory, bifurcate so that, for example,
future generations will be faced with several coequal systems of real
numbers in place of just one."
Abraham Robinson, Brouwer Memorial Lecture, [14], p. 462.
Arend Heyting made the important distinction between ￿ theories of the con-
structible￿and ￿ constructive theories￿ . Recursion theorists, in general, and com-
putable analysts, in particular, work in the domain of the constructible and
theorise about them. Constructive mathematicians, both the intuitionist de-
scendents of Brouwer and the modern followers of Bishop, develop constructive
theories. The nonstandard analyst, too, is interested in construction. The clas-
sical mathematician, especially in the incarnation as a mathematical economist,
blissfully unconcerned about such things. These traditions, philosophies and
methodologies which characterise each of these varieties of mathematics leaves
its imprint on scavenging subjects like economics, without the physicist￿ s tradi-
tion of developing an autonomous mathematical philosophy.
We are concerned, thus, with the numerical and computational emascula-
tion of economics, at a most basic level; but we are also concerned with the
philosophical, methodological and epistemological underpinnings of mathemat-
ical economics, the core determining force in the trajectory that is taken by
economic theory - and, hence, a force beyond the con￿nes of academic walls.
For close to two centuries mathematical theorising in economics has proceeded
fortuitously and haphazardly.
At the frontiers of research and policy, mathematical ￿nance theory blindly
formalizes its rules and laws in terms of, say, the Ito Stochastic Calculus - even
while sterling attempts are made to do otherwise17, with a mathematics that is
more consistent with the institutional basis of ￿nancial markets and respecting
the discrete nature of high frequency data.
Mathematical economics is replete ￿indeed, inundated ￿with existence the-
orems and their nonconstructive proofs. It is rarely pointed out that, as a result
of the methods devised to solve one of Hilbert￿ s famous ￿ Mathematical Prob-
lems￿ , the 10th, it is equally easy to show that hardly any of these existence
theorems have any hope of being algorithmised. Indeed, to take up the subject
discussed above, the Peano Existence Theorem for the IVP of ODE￿ s, one of the
frontier research results in applied recursion theory is the following, (see, [29],
chapter 9) :
Theorem 10 There is no e⁄ective method for determining, for an arbitrary
system of di⁄erential equations of the form,
P1 (x;￿1 (x);::::::;￿k (x);￿0
1 (x)) = 0
::::
:::: (6)
Pk (x;￿1 (x);::::::;￿k (x);￿0
k (x)) = 0
17I have in mind the innovative and highly stimulating book by Shafer and Vovk, [41].
23where P1;::::;Pk are polynomials with integer coe¢ cients, whether the system
has a solution on the interval [0;1]:
This is just one representative result, in an important applied domain, de-
rived using a uniform method of proof. It is entirely analogous to the way the
mathematical economist uses a few ￿ crown jewels￿￿one or another ￿x point the-
orem, the Hahn-Banach theorem, the Value Function in a dynamic programming
framework, and so on ￿to prove, ad nauseum, equilibrium existence results and
e¢ ciency postulates. Neither an investigation of the economically meaningless
axiomatic underpinnings of these theorems is ever undertaken; nor is the poor,
hapless, graduate student ever warned of the paradoxical ￿even pernicious ￿
implications of some of these axioms. Just as Uzawa￿ s equivalence theorem, be-
tween the Brouwer ￿x point theorem and the Walrasian equilibrium existence
theorem, is celebrated in economic theory and computable general equilibrium,
the time will no doubt come when some enterprising graduate student will ￿nd
a way to prove the equivalence between the Hahn-Banach Theorem and AC18
The pseudo-scienti￿c status to which economists aspire, by cloaking impre-
cise concepts with ill-￿tting mathematical clothes, has led to a neglect of the
nobility of the Linnean tradition of research.
18The one-way implication from AC to the Hahn-Banach theorem is already very well
known. If the reverse implication is also shown to be valid, Friedman￿ s infamous aphorism
about free lunches will have to be abandoned - in view of the Banach-Tarski paradox. One
apple will be more than su¢ cient to feed a whole population.
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